Haider Nehme Bakhit – Faculty of Administration and Economics – University of Kufa

Executive summary:

The quality of the roads in Iraq and the transport sector in general Iraq is very low, so Iraq may not have the operational capacity of the project during the early years of its management.

The project cost may exceed the stated value of $17 billion; Due to high global inflation rates, some estimates suggest that the cost could reach $20 billion for the reasons stated, and the Government will not be able to pay for it as debt rises to more than $100 billion.

The change or change in successive government priorities, as well as the political influences to which the project may be exposed because of the different political perspectives, represent a fundamental obstacle to its initiation. Iraq needs to be unanimous and create popular convictions about the project’s autonomy in terms of management, the ultimate goal, and the Government’s responsibility to create firm convictions that there is no political agenda for the project linked to a given axis.

In terms of security, the government will have to adjust the security index in areas north of Baghdad from terrorist cells that may find in this project vital material for targeting, as well as responsibility for neutralizing the PKK from targeting this project in the future.

Iraq needs to revitalize the diplomatic effort (Development Road Diplomacy) aimed at preparing a program by the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs aimed at promoting mutual understanding and discussions on the project with the countries of the region in the Gulf that have large ports and feel the danger of this project. and those diplomatic efforts extend to understanding the management of the Suez Canal in the classification and management of certain goods shipped by road, and to make the other party understand that the project is complementary to, rather than a substitute for, international transport efforts.

From a developmental point of view, planners must realize that relying on the development route for the port of Fao may carry serious risks, as there are still no firm reassurances or timings on the completion and operation of the port.

The Italian company PEG, which implemented the project schemes, is one of the companies that care about energy issues and does not have the competence of transport subjects.

The project’s competitiveness will be at stake from the Strait of Hormuz, especially if the Iranian-American dispute, which is always reflected in threats to close the Strait, intensifies.