Iraq After September 30: Reorganizing the Monopoly on Power and Regional Balances of Influence
Dr. Moayad Jubair Mahmoud / Academic and Political Researche
September 30 represents an important milestone in the trajectory of the relationship between the Iraqi state and the armed factions engaged in the political and security spheres. However, the importance of this date stems not from its being a procedural deadline for surrendering weapons, but rather from its being a transition point in the nature of the government’s approach to the file. The recent clarification by National Security Advisor Qasim al-Araji re-defined the function of the date itself, when he emphasized that September 30 is the date for the exit of the International Coalition, and that monopolizing weapons under state authority will begin after it in a gradual manner, along with a move toward decoupling political parties from the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) brigades.
This shift in phrasing is not a linguistic detail. It reflects a transition from a conception that dealt with the issue as a specific deadline by which the weapons problem should end, to a conception that views the problem as deeper than a timeframe, and that it is linked to rebuilding the state’s relationship with the sources of power existing within the political system itself. The armed factions whose status is meant to be organized are not bodies separate from the state and society; rather, they were formed in various security and political contexts, and some have acquired party, parliamentary, economic, and institutional extensions. This makes the process of their reorganization closer to a redistribution of influence than to a traditional disarmament process.
Hence, the matter appears more complex than knowing whether or not weapons will be handed over on September 30. The political value of this date will manifest in the nature of what comes after it: Will the government transition to an institutional path with a clear timeframe, stages, and implementation mechanisms, or will the change in terminology grant the parties more time without changing the essence of the relationship between the state and power? This point is what makes the weapons file directly linked to the future of the Iraqi political system itself, because the monopoly on power is not achieved merely by registering weapons under the name of an official institution, but rather when the state becomes the sole entity possessing the decision to use them, determining their timing, objectives, and the chain of command that moves them.
On this basis, the post-September 30 phase should be read through three overlapping levels: the Iraqi government’s ability to manage the reorganization process, Iran’s willingness to adapt to a path that may reduce some of its tools of influence without wanting to lose its political and security influence, and the United States’ position on a gradual settlement that might be acceptable if it produces actual change in military decision-making, but will not be convincing if it turns into a means of maintaining the status quo under a new name.
