Ali Mubarak AbdulNabi / Researcher
Following 2003, Iraq witnessed a radical transformation in its political structure, accompanied by significant diversity in the forces and entities that have contested elections since 2005. Most political entities and parties have been characterized by a component-based nature that did not transcend sub-identities, being divided between nationalist trends in the Kurdish regions and sectarian and tribal trends in Sunni and Shiite areas. In contrast, national and civil movements emerged that attempted to present a different political project; however, their presence remained limited, and they were unable to form a genuine alternative to traditional forces.
After the October 2019 protests, a group of civil movements emerged seeking to translate street demands into a political project. Some chose to participate in the early elections of 2021, while other movements preferred not to participate due to time constraints and the continuation of their foundational stages. The “Imtidad” Movement is considered the first of these forces to contest the elections and achieve notable results, followed by the participation of the “Qiyam” Alliance in the 2023 provincial council elections, and then the “Al-Badeel” Alliance, which contested the parliamentary elections of 2025.
Despite the presence of other civil forces proposing reformist projects across multiple governorates, these three alliances are regarded as the most prominent models in terms of organizational structure, engagement in electoral experiences, and the achievement of tangible political presence. Accordingly, this paper adopts these three models for purposes of comparison and analysis.
The research findings show that the participation of civil alliances has remained geographically limited, concentrated primarily in Shiite-majority governorates, with a clear absence in Sunni governorates and the governorates of the Kurdistan Region. This renders the portrayal of these alliances as representatives of all Iraqi components a political exaggeration not supported by electoral realities. Consequently, their electoral presence remains closer to being an extension of a socially and geographically specific environment, rather than a comprehensive alternative project to Iraq’s traditional political class.
