Economic Policies in the Electoral Programs for the October 2025 Elections in Iraq

Dr. Abbas Kazem Al-Daami – College of Administration and Economics, University of Karbala

1. Summary

• There are no reliable sources indicating the electoral programs of Iraqi blocs or their candidates for 2025, whether related to their political, economic, or social agendas.
• Most current electoral programs are inconsistent or insufficient in addressing the depth and scale of the local and regional economic and political challenges surrounding Iraq.
• Historical experience demonstrates the limited effectiveness of political blocs in implementing substantive and bold economic reforms, due to the accumulation of institutional problems such as administrative and financial corruption, weak planning institutions, fragile monetary and fiscal policies, bureaucratic and administrative inefficiency, and the poor utilization and management of economic resources—alongside the lack of political consensus and cohesion.
• Electoral campaigning does not align with economic realities. While many programs include legitimate slogans such as “development,” “anti-corruption,” and “diversification,” they lack clear financial frameworks, defined timelines, and specific implementation mechanisms.
• Iraq faces significant fiscal pressures, and in some years, financial obligations or arrears have accumulated, restricting the ability of political blocs—through the elected government—to fulfill major promises related to strategic economic projects without a clear fiscal reset.
• Political and institutional gridlock remains the greatest obstacle, resulting from a fragmented parliament, unstable alliances, partisan influence, and weak oversight—factors that collectively undermine any government’s capacity to implement genuine structural reforms.
• Past experiences reveal attempts at reform, though with limited results—there were initiatives with some impact (such as administrative reform packages in previous periods), yet they failed to translate into sustained structural transformation.
• Success remains possible, but it requires political continuity, parliamentary consensus on measures that may be temporarily unpopular, and effective oversight mechanisms—conditions that have rarely been simultaneously present in Iraq’s recent experiences.
• A detailed evaluation of each bloc necessitates access to its published program texts or recorded statements aligned with economic needs; however, many blocs do not publish clear or assessable programmatic texts.
• Most Iraqi electoral programs for 2025 are not fully aligned with the magnitude of current challenges, due to the absence of financial frameworks, limited implementation capacity, and both local and regional political factors that undermine continuity.
• Electoral programs tend to combine short-term, circumstantial promises (jobs, cash grants, local projects) with general reform slogans (anti-corruption, development), whereas the real value of such programs lies in their inclusion of realistic financial estimates, time-bound priorities, designated implementing bodies, performance measurement indicators, and independent oversight mechanisms. Accordingly, most current programs lack one or more of these essential elements.
• Voters should demand detailed programs from candidates that include financial aspects and measurable indicators; when promises are made without figures or funding sources, this should be regarded as a warning sign.
• Civil society monitors and media actors should focus on tracking contract implementation and project budgets, not merely campaign slogans.
• Policymakers and political blocs must recognize that success is achievable but requires political sacrifices—such as temporarily unpopular reforms—and the building of cross-bloc reform coalitions.
• Programs centered on a clear, singular promise may succeed politically, yet they still require a transparent financial plan to implement spending commitments or economic reforms.
• Clarity regarding costs and funding sources is critically important; the absence of clear answers to the question “Who will pay?” undermines a program’s credibility among economists and markets.
• Welfare-oriented programs must ensure long-term fiscal transparency and include plans for adapting to slow growth or potential external shocks.
• Electoral programs should be clear, measurable, and specific, rather than relying on general phrases such as “improving the economy,” by instead identifying quantitative goals such as growth rates, unemployment levels, and investment targets.
• Time-based priorities must be established through the formation of teams to follow up on immediate actions (to mitigate shocks) while adopting long-term structural reforms.
• Clear communication with the public is essential; citizens must be informed about the concessions required—such as restructuring certain services—and the reasons behind them.
• Economic indicators must be regularly monitored and reviewed through a commitment to publishing periodic executive follow-up reports that link campaign promises to tangible outcomes.

1. Introduction

To date, there are no reliable sources indicating the complete electoral programs of all Iraqi blocs or their candidates for the year 2025—whether pertaining to their political, economic, or social agendas. There are no official publications, televised debates, or radio broadcasts presenting the electoral programs that political blocs or their candidates may adopt, particularly regarding the economic issues and challenges facing the country.

Through this paper, I aim to provide an objective, evidence-based analysis that answers two key questions:

• Do the electoral programs of political parties/blocs economically correspond to the scale of the domestic, regional, and international challenges facing the Iraqi economy?
• Have past experiences demonstrated the capacity and effectiveness of these blocs—through their representatives in government and parliament—in managing successful economic policies?

Accordingly, this paper will address the following:

1. An analysis of the compatibility of electoral programs with the economic, fiscal, and regional context.
2. A critique of the blocs’ historical capacity to implement economic reforms.
3. Practical tools for assessing the realism of any electoral program and for monitoring its implementation.

The references used in this study are based on reports from international and regional institutions, as well as local analyses.

Analysis of Economic Features

Fiscal Policy and the Capacity to Finance Programs: Electoral programs typically promise increased spending on services, infrastructure projects, direct household support, and public-sector employment. These promises, however, face practical constraints, as Iraq’s economy relies heavily on oil revenues, and fluctuations in oil prices directly affect public resources.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have both recorded fiscal pressures—such as the accumulation of arrears and projected deficits—and have called for clear fiscal frameworks and revenue reforms. Any program that promises large-scale projects or extensive support without defining fiscal constraints (such as revenue sources, impact on deficit/debt, or time-bound priorities) is unrealistic.

This represents a significant obstacle to implementing any electoral program that a political bloc seeks to realize. Therefore, realistic benchmarks can be proposed as follows:

Defining Government Funding Sources

• A clear source of financing must be identified for each electoral program (oil revenue, loans, expenditure reallocation, or public–private partnerships).
• An initial estimate of each program’s impact on the fiscal deficit over a 1–3-year period should be provided.
• A contingency plan must be developed to ensure program implementation in the event of a 20–30% decline in oil prices.

Energy and Electricity Sector

• Common promises: Generation projects, reduction of power outages, new infrastructure, and partnerships with the private sector or neighboring countries.
• Practical constraints: Aging infrastructure, energy loss within the grid, illegal connections and linkages, and administrative and technical problems—all of which make these promises highly costly and require long-term technical implementation.
• Feasible programs: Gradual approaches—such as prioritizing the repair of transmission and distribution networks before expanding generation capacity—combined with clear operation and maintenance contracts and measurable technical indicators.

Economic Diversification and Investment Attraction

• Common promises: Establishing industrial cities, promoting agriculture, tourism, and renewable energy, and offering investment incentives.
• Practical constraints: An unstable legal and executive environment; foreign investors require guarantees and low-risk institutional liquidity, while external financing initiatives demand transparency and sustained follow-up.
• Diversification programs: Require integrated policy packages—including a clear investment law, customs and procurement reforms, temporary incentives, and performance metrics.

Social Policies and the Labor Market

• Common promises: Youth employment, direct support, and training programs.
• Practical constraints: The large and expanding public-sector employment—often politically motivated—is difficult to reduce; there is also a need to align training programs with actual market demand.
• More realistic solutions:

1. Targeted training programs for small and medium-sized private enterprises with employment incentives.
2. Redesigning social protection networks to make them targeted and transparent.

Anti-Corruption and Governance

• Common promises: Transparency regulations, electronic portals, and legal action against corrupt officials.
• Practical constraints: Deep-rooted corruption (Iraq’s Corruption Perceptions Index: approximately 26/100, a low score), entrenched political networks, and at times internal control over implementing and oversight institutions.
• Effective anti-corruption measures: Require practical mechanisms such as open fiscal data monitoring, public contracting portals, incentive mechanisms for whistleblower protection, and independent investigative bodies. Slogans alone are insufficient.

Regional and International Environment (External Factors)

• Risks: Oil price volatility, regional relations, external financing or debt conditions, and the impact of regional conflicts on supply chains.
• Any program must include alternative scenarios (e.g., oil price shocks, suspension of external financing, or regional pressures) and technical options to maintain essential services in the event of funding reductions.

Practical Experience (Brief Historical Examples)

• Reform Package (2015): Administrative and fiscal measures were launched to reduce bureaucracy and limit corruption. These achieved limited progress but did not result in comprehensive institutional transformation.
• Subsequent Attempts: Later governments (during 2020–2022), which also made promises to combat corruption, faced political resistance and administrative constraints; thus, the outcomes were partial.
• The Most Recent Case (Fiscal Pressures 2024–2025): Reports from the International Monetary Fund indicate expanding public expenditure alongside emerging financing constraints and the accumulation of arrears. This demonstrates the limited fiscal space available to fulfill broad electoral promises in the absence of clearly defined priorities.

Success remains possible; however, it requires political continuity, parliamentary consensus on measures that may be temporarily unpopular, and effective oversight mechanisms—conditions that have rarely coexisted in Iraq’s recent experiences.

Electoral programs presented during the election period can be examined and evaluated according to the following criteria:

• Do the electoral programs include a fiscal framework specifying funding sources and their impact on the deficit over a 1–3-year period?
• Does the electoral program feature clear temporal priorities (urgent projects versus structural reforms)?
• Are there measurable government performance indicators (KPIs) for each promise (e.g., reducing power outages by X% within 24 months)?
• Do the programs specify implementation mechanisms (ministries/agencies, partnerships, management contracts, implementation teams)?
• Do the programs include transparency mechanisms (contract publication, project implementation portals, independent oversight)?
• Are program risk scenarios (oil price decline, suspension of external financing) and alternative plans presented?
• Do the programs outline steps for institutional capacity building (digitalization, training, public accounting reform)?
• Do they specify how the program will be evaluated by independent entities (civil institutions, international banks)?
• Is the program politically compatible with potential coalitions, or does it rely on the assumption of an absolute majority?
• Does the program ensure concrete anti-corruption measures (whistleblower protection, annual external audits)?

A detailed evaluation of each political bloc requires access to its published program texts or documented statements that correspond with the criteria mentioned above, as many blocs do not release clear or accessible texts that can be easily assessed.

How Can More Realistic Electoral Programs Be Formulated?

• Political blocs must present their electoral programs within a clear fiscal framework, identifying the source of financing and its effect on the deficit; they should commit only to what can be funded or reallocated.
• Distinguish between emergency policies and structural reforms: blocs should set a timeline for their electoral programs (0–12 months, 12–36 months, more than 36 months).
• Establish small, specialized implementation units: independent teams, performance-based contracts with clear indicators, and rewards or penalties tied to results.
• Develop pilot programs before national expansion, by testing a model in one province or sector, evaluating it, and scaling it up based on outcomes and feedback.
• Ensure political consensus on priorities: before launching unpopular reforms (such as subsidy or salary reforms), parliamentary alliances must be secured to ensure the plan’s continuity across government transitions.

Developing Tools for Monitoring and Implementing Electoral Programs

Civil society and the media can play their oversight role (through a quick-action framework) by monitoring the electoral programs proposed by political blocs or candidates through the following mechanisms:

• Quarterly Monitoring Bulletin: Tracking spending versus implementation plans (Budget vs. Program).
• Open Contracts Portal: Verifying bids, prices, and winning entities.
• Project Performance Observatory: Monitoring tangible indicators (e.g., how many megawatts were generated? How many kilometers of roads were completed? How many genuine job opportunities were created?).
• Coordination among organizations: Following up on citizen complaints and comparing candidates’ promises with actual implementation.

General Assessment: In their current form, most Iraqi electoral programs for 2025 are not fully aligned with the depth of existing challenges, due to the absence of financial frameworks, limited implementation capacity, and regional and domestic political factors that undermine continuity.

Why Do Electoral Programs Usually Fail to Match the Challenges?

• Oil Dependence and Real Fiscal Constraints: Many programs propose large-scale projects or broad subsidies without a clear financing framework (funding sources, effects on deficit and debt, or spending priorities). The Iraqi economy remains vulnerable to oil price shocks, and budget financing capacity is limited.
• Weak Institutions and Implementation: Even when reasonable policies are formulated, the state lacks the capacity for effective execution (procurement management, transparent public contracting, project follow-up), which undermines any ambitious promises.
• Corruption Drains Resources: Extensive corruption networks weaken public spending efficiency and diminish the impact of development programs. Reports indicate that project implementation and external financing have repeatedly been affected by non-transparent practices.
• Fragmented Political Priorities and Short-Term Focus: Electoral programs are often designed to attract local electoral bases (jobs, quick service projects) rather than to achieve long-term structural reforms (labor market liberalization, tax reform, digital governance). This misalignment with the need for structural fiscal reforms renders such programs temporary solutions.
• Regional and International Environment: Regional tensions, dependence on imports and commodities, and diplomatic pressures influence economic choices and impose policies different from the local slogans declared (such as financial constraints or conditions attached to external partnerships).

Have Political Blocs Proven Capable of Managing Successful Economic Policies?

• Overall assessments by external and domestic evaluation bodies and advisors indicate that successive governments and dominant parliamentary blocs have not yet succeeded in implementing structural, sustainable fiscal reforms commensurate with the scale of required transformation. While there have been sectoral achievements and local projects, these have not resulted in institutional transformation or genuine economic diversification in Iraq.
• Practical obstacles evident from experience include political discontinuity and government changes that interrupt reform trajectories before they reach maturity.
• Political Alliances and Patronage: Employment policies and contract allocations are often used to consolidate political bases rather than as tools for development.
• Weak Oversight and Governance: The lack of supervisory councils, limited financial accountability, and insufficient transparency in public tenders all reduce the effectiveness of public spending.

Are the Programs “Realistic” or “Electoral Posturing”?

In reality, many electoral programs combine short-term, circumstantial promises (jobs, cash grants, local projects) with general reform slogans (anti-corruption, development). However, the real value of a program lies in its inclusion of:

1. Realistic financial estimates;
2. Time-bound priorities;
3. A designated implementing authority;
4. Performance measurement indicators; and
5. Independent oversight mechanisms.

Most current programs lack one or more of these essential components.

How to Make Electoral Programs Coherent and Implementable

• Include a Fiscal Framework (Fiscal Anchor) for Each Program: Clearly identify funding sources, explain their impact on deficit and debt, and establish priority sequencing over 1–3–5 years.
• Prioritize Policies by Impact and Speed: Differentiate between emergency measures (salary payments, temporary energy support) and structural reforms (tax reform, disciplined privatization, improving the business environment). It is preferable to begin with low-cost, high-impact actions.
• Ensure Transparency and Independent Oversight Mechanisms: Publish contracts, provide project implementation portals, enable effective parliamentary oversight, and include civil society participation in monitoring to reduce corruption and enhance public trust.
• Institutional Capacity-Building Programs: Digitalize public finance systems, update national economic statistics, and train personnel in key ministries (Finance, Planning, Oil, and Electricity).
• Integrated Policy Packages Acknowledging Regional Risks: Develop alternative scenarios for oil price fluctuations to ensure the stability of social services in the event of declining export revenues.

What Does This Mean for the Voter, the Monitor, and the Decision-Maker?

• For the Voter: Demand financial details and measurable indicators in programs; promises without figures or funding sources are warning signs.
• For Civil Monitors and the Media: Focus on tracking contract execution and project budgets, not just campaign slogans.
• For Decision-Makers and Political Blocs: Success is achievable, but it requires political sacrifices (such as temporarily unpopular reforms) and the building of cross-bloc reform coalitions.

International Experiences with Electoral Programs

Economic electoral programs serve two main purposes:

• To clarify the party’s or candidate’s vision for the national economy.
• To shape expectations among voters and markets.

Success in implementation depends on the alignment between promises and technical flexibility, as well as on financial capacity and communication management. The following are selected international examples of electoral programs and their economic alignment:

• United Kingdom — 2019 Elections (Conservative Party: Get Brexit Done)
• Program content: A strong focus on a central issue (leaving the European Union), along with promises to stimulate investment and infrastructure, while committing not to immediately reduce major taxes. Subsequent reports analyzed the implementation of these promises and the fiscal constraints involved.
• Practical outcome: Achieving the central commitment (Brexit) reshaped spending and policy priorities; however, some economic promises faced implementation and budgetary limitations.
• Brief lesson: Programs centered on a clear, central pledge may succeed politically, but they require a transparent fiscal plan to implement spending commitments or economic reforms.
• United States — Party Platforms (Examples from Recent Democratic and Republican Agendas)
• Typical content: Disputes over taxation, social spending, minimum wage, financial regulation, and the role of the Federal Reserve. Studies analyze the detailed differences and how they translate into policies during governing periods.
• Practical outcome: Divergent platforms lead to different policy tools (fiscal stimulus versus tax cuts/deregulation). Implementation is influenced by the balance of power in Congress and by economic circumstances (such as the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020).
• Brief lesson: Clarity regarding costs and financing is crucial; the absence of clear answers about who will pay weakens a program’s credibility among economists and markets.
• Sweden — The Welfare Model and Social Programs
• Program characteristics: Traditional parties in Sweden (such as the Social Democrats and others) rely on programs combining a flexible labor market with broad social protection, financed through progressive taxation. Reports from international organizations track performance and structural reserves.
• Practical outcome: The model reinforces citizens’ trust in social safety networks but has faced pressures from slower growth and external shocks, prompting parties to adjust policies to ensure fiscal sustainability.
• Brief lesson: Welfare programs require long-term fiscal transparency (projected costs) and adaptive plans to cope with growth slowdowns or external shocks.
• Chile — 2019 Protests and Policy Responses
• What happened: Widespread protests in 2019 revealed public frustration over inequality and deficiencies in public services. The political response included promises of constitutional and economic reforms, accompanied by analyses from international institutions on issues of inequality and the economy.
• Practical outcome: A rapid shift toward institutional reforms and the opening of constitutional and economic debates, though some proposals faced political resistance and concerns about implementation costs and economic impacts.
• Brief lesson: Programs responding to social crises must combine urgent measures (to ease tensions) with a long-term institutional reform plan, supported by clear financing calculations to avoid undermining economic confidence.

Conclusion

Practical Recommendations for Designing and Evaluating an Economic Electoral Program

To ensure that an electoral program contributes to addressing the country’s economic challenges and obstacles, enhances the success of the political process, and improves governmental performance, the following are recommended:

• Develop clear and measurable electoral programs: Replace general phrases such as “improving the economy” with specific numerical targets (growth, unemployment, investment).
• Adopt transparent financing plans: Align with funding sources (taxation, loans, reallocation of expenditures) and include cost estimates over a 3–5 year horizon.
• Establish time-based priorities: Form teams to monitor immediate actions (to mitigate short-term shocks) and to adopt long-term structural reforms.
• Conduct stress tests: Present scenarios such as low growth or external shocks to strengthen the plan’s credibility.
• Ensure clear public communication: Explain the necessary trade-offs, such as which services may be restructured and why.
• Track and review economic indicators: Commit to publishing periodic executive follow-up reports that link promises with tangible results.

Sources

• International Monetary Fund (IMF): Article IV Consultation Report and Annexes — Assessment of fiscal conditions and need for structural reforms (2025).
• International Monetary Fund (IMF): Country Economic Assessment Report (2025).
• World Bank: Iraq Development and Economic Status Report (2023).
• UNDP and Civil Society Organizations: Monitoring reports on corruption and oversight of major issues (2024–2025).
• Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI): Assessment of Iraq’s Governance, Economy, and Political Environment (2024) — Overview of political and implementation barriers.