The fall of the Afghan State and the way Iran deals with its data have created various assumptions and possibilities at the level of experts and followers in the Middle East, which is one of the countries with the largest transnational agendas associated with Iran, Fatimids (al-Fātimiyyūn).
Iran seems quiet about the Afghan crisis at its best, as it is arranging its papers for the next phase, but some media reports have highlighted the existence of synergies between Tehran and the Taliban. The news outlet “Middle East Eye”, citing sources close to the Iranian Jerusalem Corps, is part of the Iranian relationship with the Taliban, where the Iraqi source says the words of the leaderships close to the General. “Qasem Soleimani,” that he personally entered into agreements with the Taliban in 2015, by which Iran agreed to provide financial, logistical, and military support to the Taliban, as well as training camps within Iranian borders. In return, the Taliban would avoid any attacks on the Shia of Afghanistan. Iran would also ensure that the return of the Fatimids to Afghan territory wouldn`t happen.The source added that during the negotiations, Iran stressed that the Taliban should focus the war on ISIS and intensify its attacks against US forces.
The source adds that the recent fall of Afghanistan put many of Iraq’s armed Shiite factions under the line of responsibility. Some even started threatening and promising after Shiite areas fell to the Taliban. Once the threats were issued, an Iranian delegation was sent to Iraq, warning the armed factions not to move against the Taliban and to focus and maneuver on defeating the United States in Afghanistan and its possible recurrence in Iraq, alerting them that the Shia of Afghanistan cannot be assisted at the present time; Because of their geopolitical status, any breach of the 2015 agreement would get them killed and shed their blood.
The report then addresses the entry of the Taliban into Mazar-i-Sharif and the safe withdrawal of the fighters of the Afghan State Unity Party (Hezbe Wahdat), without any resistance, by direct order from Iran. The report then addresses Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Al-Sistani’s avoidance of direct intervention in anticipation of sectarian strife, knowing that the possibility of intervention is unlikely and not possible because of the Shia minority1.
Given the above, the following question may arise: What is the nature of the position that Tehran has drawn for itself in the next phase of regional changes?
Iran’s foreign strategy, as stated in its constitution, is to form a powerful bloc based on the opposition for the West and the so-called “union of the vulnerable,” which has evolved over the past four decades into several phases and visions.
After all, it was exclusively with Shia parties aligned only with Iranian politics, and then Iran was not willing to ally itself with forces that were politically incompatible with Iran, even if they were Shia or had common goals with Iran, such as a movement. “Hope,” then the alliances expanded to include Sunni components compatible with Iranian policies such as Hamas in Palestine and the Islamic Front in Algeria. In the next step, secular and Christian movements compatible with Iranian politics were also added: Ahmed Jibril Group (Palestinian), Assad Government (Syria), and Michel Aoun Wing (Lebanon). The final step adopted by Tehran is Expanding alliances with parties incompatible with Iranian policies, but with shared tactical visions and objectives, while not adhering to their Islamic status.
The PKK and Taliban have been the proponents of recent alliances with Tehran, where the Turkish Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) is a separatist party while enjoying Iranian support to pressure Turkey and to establish a link between Kurdistan and Syria. There is nothing to do with Tehran other than a tactical alliance and a common objective2, while the partially Iranian-backed Taliban, which may go against Iran one day in the future, but for the time being, Tehran favors an alliance with them, and it is not unlikely that this cooperation will overlook ISIS activities in Deir Ez-Zor; To put pressure on American bases in the area.
These alliances seem to be tactical, because the origin of Iran’s solid program of alliances depends on the nature and magnitude of the hostility with the United States, even if it is temporary or unreliable, and this is not without its connection to the nuclear file. Iran is determined to close the nuclear file, either by creating an atmosphere and powerful pressure on Biden to obtain solid nuclear assurances or by the way of effective or future force, so that the opposing party will not be able to take firm and robust action.
In its foreign interactions, Iran has focused on devoting its capabilities to strengthening its position in the face of the next nuclear phase, where the principles and standards of the Islamic Republic are diminished at the expense of the availability of tools to confront the West. On one hand, Tehran is fully aware that the chances of reaching a long-term nuclear agreement are far from being reached. On the other hand, it believes that the opportunity to reach a relative agreement with the West may be lost in a republican state, legal means to counter it may then be absent.
It is not unlikely that Iran will move towards a nuclear transition in order to press for agreement, identify the reactions of the opposing party, which Israel does not wish, as it is likely to go into a series of subversive actions or direct confrontation, which has made Iran likely to build broad and tactical alliances over narrow and loyalist ones. It is imperative that Tehran move away from States with decision-making and official opinion, that is, subject to governmental criteria, and focus more broadly on forces acting on behalf and outside the power of the State or not subject to the political decision of its government, in order to provide preventive repulsion tools to the highest extent possible, to avoid and minimize harm as possible.
What Iran needs in the next phase is pressure to ensure that the Republicans accept the nuclear agreement in the next election cycle3. If rejected, Iran still has a strong security guarantee route: to ensure nuclear capability. To maintain these guarantees, it also requires extensive capacity in large geographical patches, where Tehran continues to fill those gaps.