Ahmed Khalil Artemty – researcher in Russian affairs.

International actors are joining forces to delineate a new world order with a multi-concept in light of the current global developments and events, especially after the Russian-Ukrainian war. The countries that have received Western sanctions are seeking to strengthen their relationship with each other on a hostile front and in opposition to those sanctions and international isolation. In this sense, Russia has sought to consolidate its relationship with emerging countries and emerging economies, and direct its relationship towards partnerships in multiple fields; To compensate its markets and exports to the countries of East and Central Asia; In search of alternatives that provide a suitable ground for reviving its economy. Today, the Russian strategy is working to exploit its historical path of cooperation and partnership with India to mitigate the effects of those US and Western sanctions, as well as to win a major country like India in the camp of countries opposed to American and Western policy, with many challenges that do not allow India to join such alliances. Especially when it has high-level military, economic and trade relations and alliances with the United States, so relinquishing these privileges will have unforgiving consequences for the political and economic system in India. Especially as it was one of the first countries to create the concept of non-alignment that adopted it in the 1960s, seeking to avoid alignment within the competing camps at the time, and based on the idea of pragmatism in foreign policy.However, recent events on the international scene have called on the two countries to take many positions, including India’s failure to criticize Russia in the 2014 Crimean crisis, and Russia’s support for India’s policies in the Kashmir region. In addition to India’s abstention from voting on the UN draft resolution condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine in the UN Security Council, Russia praised this position and issued a statement in which it indicated its pledge to continue close dialogue with India on the situation in Ukraine. But Russia’s rapprochement with India’s neighboring countries, such as China and Pakistan, was and still is a stumbling block in the typical relationship between the two countries. Especially with the focus of the United States of America to strengthen its cooperation with India in military alliances that were in its mind efforts to limit the Chinese role, reduce the strength of the relationship between Russia and China, and influence the strategy of these two countries in the East and Central Asian continent. The American goal is to dwarf the Russian influence, make it succumb to sanctions, and announce an unconditional withdrawal from Ukraine in light of the war of attrition that Washington is practicing against Russia in Ukraine. In addition to its endeavors to deliver indirect messages to countries that seek to create a multipolar world order, which would pave the way for the overthrow of American hegemony in the world. The United States of America sees India as one of the most important factors that may stand and limit Chinese and Russian influence in East Asia. All these facts and situations pave the way for us to question the reasons for the reluctance of the Indian position in the Russian-Ukrainian war, what are the decision-makers in India thinking of? What are the limitations and obstacles in Russian-Indian relations?

Decades of Collaboration in the Twentieth Century…

After 90 years of British colonialism, India became independent in mid-August 1947 and sought to adopt a foreign policy characterized by independence and impartiality in its political and strategic orientations, taking pragmatism as a starting point for its dealings with international units and global issues. In that era that roamed the world of splitting into two camps (East and West), India rejected the policy of alliances as a violation of its independent decision. In theory, it wanted good relations with both the Soviet Union and the United States. In practice, however, India’s first prime minister (Jawaharlal Nehru) had a bright idea of the Soviet Union, and a preference for the ideas of Fabian socialism (British socialism aimed at strengthening the principles of democratic socialism through gradualism and reform, not revolution). However, the strengthening of Soviet aid in the economic and military fields won the confidence of the Indian leaders. Soviet (and later Russian) arms sales were not seen as a way for Moscow to hold the Indian market but were often greeted with warmth. The Russian decision (veto) in the Security Council on Kashmir, made New Delhi look at Moscow as a strategic ally. Moscow has consistently proven to be a reliable partner for New Delhi in times of need. Since the United States banned arms exports to the Indian subcontinent in the Kashmir War in 1965, the Soviet Union was then the number one supplier of arms to India. While the United States supported Pakistan in the Bangladesh liberation war in 1971 by sending an aircraft carrier to the Bay of Bengal, the Indo-American relations deteriorated further until 1991. In return, Moscow supported India, especially when New Delhi conducted its nuclear tests in the late 1990s, and actually helped it in its nuclear program.