



# The 2025 Parliamentary Election Results and Al-Bayan Center Polls... Under Scrutiny

Research Department





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### About

Al-Bayan Center for Planning and Studies is an independent, nonprofit think tank based in Baghdad, Iraq. Its primary mission is to offer an authentic perspective on public and foreign policy issues related to Iraq and the region.

Al-Bayan Center pursues its vision by conducting independent analysis, as well as proposing workable solutions for complex issues that concern policy-makers and academics.

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Since 2014

The importance of electoral public opinion polls generally lies in their ability to help understand and predict voter behavior, identify voting trends among various social segments and geographical areas, and provide valuable data to decision-makers and candidates seeking to understand voters and adjust their strategies. Polls also help forecast final results before their official announcement (predicting election outcomes), and they reveal the social and demographic characteristics of voters—such as age, gender, and region—and how these characteristics influence their voting decisions (understanding voter behavior). They also display variations in voting trends across different social groups and geographic regions (identifying voting disparities). Polls additionally supply candidates with vital information about voters, enabling them to design their electoral campaigns effectively (supporting candidate campaigns). After elections, post-voting surveys (exit polls) offer the sole source for analyzing and interpreting election results and voting trends (interpreting results). Polls further contribute to measuring public opinion on specific issues related to elections or broader public affairs, such as legislation and provided services (measuring public opinion).

For this reason, Al-Bayan Center for Studies and Planning has routinely conducted public opinion polls preceding every parliamentary election cycle, with the aim of identifying respondents' orientations, their voting and participation



intentions, and the entities and individuals they intend to support. For the current elections, the Center conducted two public opinion polls: the first in July, and the second in October—approximately three months later. Both polls revealed that the participation rate in the current elections would rise compared to the turnout in the 2021 elections. Despite the boycott by the Sadrist Movement, and the intense enthusiasm of its supporters in publishing, promoting, mobilizing for, and encouraging that boycott—not to mention the recurring proportion, in every election, of those who remain silent or disinterested in the elections altogether—the participation rates indicated by the polls appeared extraordinary, even exceeding expectations, ranging between 65% and 75% in the two respective surveys. Meanwhile, the Independent High Electoral Commission announced that the participation rate (general voting, special voting, and IDP voting combined) had reached approximately 56% nationwide.

Indeed, the poll results discerned and predicted the rise in turnout, but they did not succeed in estimating it accurately. This is due to numerous factors, including the conditions and constraints of sample selection (sample units drawn exclusively from updated data; direct phone contact; matching the proportion of each governorate's population to its share of the sample; distribution across districts and sub-districts, etc.), the size and limitations of the sample (3,000 across all Iraqi



governorates), the degree to which the sample distribution aligns with actual demographic spread and diversity (gender, age, education, ethnicity, etc.), and many other considerations. Most importantly, the poll results indicated that approximately 30% of the sample units had changed their stance regarding participation: they had boycotted the 2021 elections but decided to participate in the 2025 elections. This is a distinctive finding that set Al-Bayan Center apart from other research and policy institutions.

Regarding turnout by governorate—specifically which governorates recorded the highest and lowest participation—the poll results showed the highest turnout in Dohuk Governorate and the lowest in Maysan. This is precisely what occurred according to the results announced by the Independent High Electoral Commission.

According to the preliminary results released by the Independent High Electoral Commission, ten parties and coalitions secured 60.9% of the total votes cast in the elections. They are, respectively:

1. Reconstruction and Development Coalition
2. Kurdistan Democratic Party
3. Taqaddum Party
4. State of Law Coalition



5. Al-Sadiqun Movement
6. Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
7. Badr Organization
8. National State Forces Alliance
9. Azm Alliance
10. National Sovereignty Alliance – Tashree‘

Among Shi‘a forces, the Reconstruction and Development Coalition ranked first, followed by the State of Law Coalition, then the Al-Sadiqun Movement, then the Badr Organization, and finally the National State Forces Alliance. Among Sunni forces, Taqaddum Party ranked first, followed by the Azm Alliance, and finally the National Sovereignty Alliance – Tashree‘. Among Kurdish forces, the Kurdistan Democratic Party ranked first, followed by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.

The election results closely corresponded to the findings of Al-Bayan Center’s poll, which had indicated that ten parties and coalitions would lead the scene and secure approximately 60.4% of total votes. They appeared as follows:

1. Reconstruction and Development Coalition
2. Kurdistan Democratic Party
3. Taqaddum Party





4. State of Law Coalition
5. Al-Sadiqun Movement
6. People's Front
7. Badr Organization
8. National State Forces Alliance
9. AlAsas Coalition
10. Azm Alliance

1. A comparison shows general closeness between the results, but with differences at the component level (Kurdishly, People's Front instead of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan), and among Sunni and Shi'a forces (AlAsas Coalition instead of the National Sovereignty Alliance).

Regarding the Shi'a coalition that won first place (the Reconstruction and Development Coalition), the poll predicted that it would rank first in eight governorates: Baghdad, Maysan, Dhi Qar, Ninawa, Karbala, Najaf, Babil, and Qadisiyyah. The election results corresponded to its victory in eight governorates as well: Baghdad, Maysan, Dhi Qar, Muthanna, Karbala, Najaf, Babil, and Qadisiyyah. The difference occurred in only one governorate: according to the poll, it ranked second in Muthanna, whereas it ranked first

there according to the election results. The reason for this is that a considerable number of respondents in the governorate preferred the option “I have not yet decided whom I will vote for,” which postponed determining the ranking of some parties and coalitions.

As for the Sunni party that won first place (Taqaddum Party), the poll predicted that it would take first place in two governorates: Anbar and Diyala. The election results, however, showed its matching victory in two governorates: Anbar and Salah al-Din. According to the poll, it ranked second in Salah al-Din but first there in the election results. The reason is that a considerable number of respondents in the governorate also preferred the option “I have not yet decided whom I will vote for,” which postponed determining the ranking of some parties and coalitions.

Meanwhile, regarding the Kurdish party that won first place (the Kurdistan Democratic Party), the poll indicated that it would rank first in two governorates: Erbil and Dohuk. The election results, however, showed that it ranked first in four governorates: Erbil, Dohuk, Ninawa, and Kirkuk. The poll failed to detect the latter two. The reason lies in the outdated phone numbers used to contact respondents and the Center’s inability to obtain updated numbers for newer age cohorts—specifically those born in 2005, 2006, and 2007—whose participation had a significant influence on determining voting





outcomes and increasing turnout rates.

As for the total number of seats, the analytical trajectory of the survey results indicated that the Reconstruction and Development Coalition could secure 48–53 seats; the Kurdistan Democratic Party was expected to obtain 35–38 seats; Taqaddum Party was expected to obtain 38–40 seats; the State of Law Coalition 33–37 seats; the Al-Sadiqun Movement 24–30 seats; followed by the National State Forces Alliance with 15–19 seats; then the Badr Organization with 6–9 seats; and then the Azm Alliance with 12–15 seats. The election results were, to a large extent, very close to these expectations. According to the preliminary results announced by the Independent High Electoral Commission, the Reconstruction and Development Coalition obtained 46 seats; the State of Law Coalition obtained 30 seats; the Al-Sadiqun Movement obtained 28 seats; the Badr Organization obtained 18 seats; the National State Forces Alliance 18 seats; the Kurdistan Democratic Party 27 seats; the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 18 seats; and the Azm Alliance 16 seats. Although these are preliminary results that may undergo slight changes—ranging between one or two seats per party due to appeals, complaints, or the quota system—they highlight the closeness revealed by the survey. The only clear discrepancy in these projections concerns the Badr Organization, which obtained a higher number of seats due to the increased turnout rate and the changes in the



electoral map for some other forces and candidates.

Based on the foregoing, the importance of research, studies, and think tank centers becomes evident in measuring public opinion to identify voters' orientations and their intentions regarding voting and participation, as well as in forecasting election results. This necessitates increasing the confidence of political forces and parties in the role and importance of such centers in shaping public opinion, mobilization, strategic messaging, and identifying areas of support on which to focus. This, in turn, requires their contribution to supporting and funding these centers so they can conduct numerous pre-election polls, thereby helping reduce effort, concentrate work, and minimize waste in campaigning, distribution, and outreach.





**For an Active state  
and a participating society**

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