



Reconstruction and Development in Post-Islamic State Iraq: Analysing Options for United Nations Support through Resolutions

Research Department



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As of the summer of 2016, Iraq is gradually winning its war against the Islamic State (IS). Major urban centres such as Ramadi and Fallujah have been liberated and the Iraqi security forces are slowly encircling Mosul, IS' regional capital and the last major urban centre still in their grasp in Iraq. It is estimated that the city will fall before the end of 2016, spelling the end of its two-year occupation and the end of the group's ambitions of statehood within Iraqi territory. However, even as the military challenge is resolved, Iraq still faces significant challenges in socio-economic and developmental sectors.

The war has displaced thousands and devastated what little infrastructure there was. Iraq will need urgent reconstruction and development in order to alleviate the humanitarian suffering, rebuild support among the populace, treat those who have been traumatised and prevent another round of instability. With the Iraqi economy suffering from the effects of the war and the low oil prices, it will be difficult to afford the costs of all these measures. As such, Iraq is in need to support for its reconstruction and development. This report analyses whether the Iraqi Government can leverage such support through the mechanisms of the United Nations (UN) and whether any single state has been successful on putting pressure on the organisation to gain support relating to humanitarian and developmental concerns.

The report looks at the Resolutions based on humanitarian or developmental concerns that were voted in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), analysing how they were voted in and whether they led to any instructional changes and then provides guidelines on how Iraq can create a similar Resolution. The report identifies numerous precedents of a single (or small groups of) Member-States sponsoring a Resolution that is voted in resulted in institutional change. It finds that frequently, even non-security issues were framed in security concerns to increase support and this is symptomatic of the UN's growing focus on the development-security nexus.

The report argues that a prospective Resolution on Iraqi Reconstruction and Development can easily be framed in a similar manner and the UNGA provides the best avenue of approach for such a Resolution.

Overview of the United Nations:

The structure and mechanisms of the United Nations allows for Member-States to propose a Resolution and, ultimately, enact a policy in a variety of ways. The two main organs for Resolution-making is the UNGA and the UNSC, both of which have their advantages and disadvantages towards putting through a Resolution that seeks to gain support for Iraqi reconstruction and development. Over the course of the Cold War, the decision-making mechanisms of the United Nations Security Council were deadlocked due to the veto powers possessed by its rivalling members. As such, the United Nations General Assembly acted as the primary forum for resolution-making.

This changed significantly since the end of the Cold War. The retreat of Russia from international politics (albeit temporarily) and China's willingness to be seen as a responsible, cooperative partner meant that UNSC Member-States were less likely to resist Resolutions being passed, allowing it to become a lot more active in UN dealings. In fact, both the UNGA and the UNSC have expanded their scope since the end of the Cold War, debating and drawing Resolutions on humanitarian, environmental or developmental concerns. For this reason, all the Resolutions listed below that can act as a precedent for Iraq to propose its own Resolution were drafted and voted since the end of the Cold War.

The United Nations General Assembly:

The United Nations General Assembly is one of the principal organs of the United Nations and is the only organ where all UN member states have equal representation. Its powers are to oversee the budget of the United Nations, appoint the non-permanent members to the Security Council, receive reports from other agencies of the United Nations and make recommendations in the form of General Assembly Resolutions.

UNGA Resolutions can be brought forward by any state (or groups of states) that sponsor them. Resolutions are voted on a one-vote-per-member

basis. Important questions (such as budgetary concerns, the election, admission, suspension or expulsion of members or recommendations on peace and security) require a two-thirds majority. On all other issues, a simple majority is sufficient. Resolutions voted by the United Nations are non-binding and are generally not enforceable as a legal or practical matter, because the General Assembly lacks enforcement powers with respect to most issues.

In the absence of enforceability, the UNGA Resolutions are employed to raise awareness on a particular issue, build consensus, gauge support and generate pressure. Resolutions therefore have significant political weight despite being non-binding. Additionally, although a resolution itself is non-binding, sufficient support for a resolution can lead to the formations of international policies and institutions that are binding. Finally, the UNGA can refer the issue to the Security Council which can then put in place a binding resolution. All these make the UNGA Resolution an immensely powerful and flexible tool as long as it is utilised with political acumen and a realistic policy goal in mind. It allows developing countries to put pressure on the international community and it can even be perceived as a more democratic option compared to the UNSC.

For the purposes of this report, three UNGA Resolutions have been identified as being of particular relevance: Resolutions 63/168, 55/56 and 68/262. Each of these policies are significant in that they were able to achieve (or initiate the process of) policy changes despite the non-binding nature of UNGA Resolutions. Two of the Resolutions specifically addressed humanitarian concerns and while the last one addressed security issues, it is significant in that it has managed to subvert a UNSC veto.

The UNGA Resolution 63/168¹, also known as the *United Nations Moratorium on the Death Penalty* which was sponsored by Italy presented and by the European Union, beseeched for the suspension of the Death Penalty worldwide. It called on States that maintain the death penalty to establish a timeline for abolition and restrict the number of offences where the death penalty is applied, appealing on States that have abolished it to

1. This resolution was affirmed twice, first as Resoution 62/149 on December 2007 in the Third Committee before passing in the General Assembly as Resolution 63/168 on December 2008.

not re-introduce it². Although voted against by major powers such as USA, China, Saudi Arabia, Iran and India, the Resolution passed. Despite its non-binding characteristic, the Resolution has led to a significant political alignment among countries that seek to abolish the death penalty. In 2010, the International Commission Against the Death Penalty was formed, calling for the creation of a universal moratorium³.

The Commission itself analyses national and international laws regarding death penalty and lobbies governments to change them while raising awareness on individual cases where death penalty is applied. The relevance of this Resolution towards Iraq is that it shows how a Resolution sponsored by a single member and addressed towards non-urgent humanitarian concerns (which are traditionally considered low priority in international politics) can not only be voted in despite opposition from major powers but also initiate a policy shift, defining the acceptable modes of State behaviour, endorsing and normalising abolition while highlighting death penalty itself as an aberration.

The UNGA Resolution 55/56 is a similar example that had more success of policy change, actually leading to the implementation of a system supported by international regimes. Resolution 55/56, also known as the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), was aimed at curtailing the sale and trade of conflict diamonds (“blood diamond”) that were mined under inhumane circumstances, could fuel terrorist organisations and were often used to circumvent sanctions.

The Resolution, which was penned by Canadian diplomat Robert Fowler, was ratified in December 2000 and supported the creation of an international certification scheme for rough diamonds. The scheme empowered the World Trade Organisation and the World Diamond Council to create warranties for diamonds to ensure that they did not originate from a conflict zone and investigate allegations of conflict diamond sale. Buyers and traders of signatory countries were required to only deal with

2. “General Assembly Adopts Landmark Text Calling for Moratorium on Death Penalty”, United Nations, 18-December-2007, <<http://www.un.org/press/en/2007/ga10678.doc.htm>>, [Accessed 02-August-2016]

3. “The Death Penalty in the OSCE Area: Background Paper 2011” Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 28-September-2011, <<http://www.osce.org/odihr/82896>>, [Accessed 02-August-2016]

the certified diamonds and risked expulsion if found to be in violation⁴. The Scheme is, therefore, an important example of what can be achieved through a General Assembly Resolution. Even though the Resolution was non-binding, it prompted States and international organisations to create a series of policies that did become binding to its signatories, thereby defining the acceptable modes of behaviour just like the *Moratorium* did. The manner in which this Resolution led to a string of policies is not only significant on its own, it is particularly relevant for Iraq as it linked a humanitarian and economic concern with that of security. As it will be explained below, similar linkages exist between development and security that the Iraqi delegation can use in a similar manner to generate support for a Resolution.

The UNGA Resolution 68/262, on the other hand, shows how a UNGA Resolution can end up putting pressure on major powers. Titled *Territorial integrity of Ukraine*, the Resolution was sponsored by Canada, Costa Rica, Germany, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine in response to the Russian Annexation of Crimea. Ordinarily, an issue like this would fall under the authority of the UNSC. However, Russia used its veto power to block any resolution condemning its actions in Crimea, leading to the creation of a UNGA Resolution, which passed⁵.

The passing of the Resolution increased the political pressure on Russia, strengthening the sanctions regime that was already being applied by the US, EU and their allies. It demonstrated that with enough opposition, demonstrated through a symbolic number of States voting against Russia's actions, a UNGA Resolution can be effective despite its non-binding statute. As it will be described below, the likelihood of an Iraqi Resolution for Reconstruction and Development passing in the UNGA is far higher than the UNSC. The dynamics between the two organs of the UN and how, in this instance, the UNGA was able to trump over the UNSC is important to recognise.

4. "About the Kimberley Process", Kimberley Process, <<https://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/about>>, [Accessed 03-August-2016]

5. "Backing Ukraine's Territorial Integrity, UN Assembly Declares Crimea Referendum Invalid", UN News Centre, 27-March-2014, <<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47443&Cr=ukraine&Cr1=#.V6HbXdIrlDV>>, [Accessed 03-August-2016]

Ultimately, while there is no precedent for a UNGA Resolution towards requesting reconstruction and development assistance, the Resolutions listed above display that a precedent towards ratifying Resolutions based on humanitarian concerns exists. Moreover, where concerns of humanitarianism and security converge (as was the case on Resolution 55/56), the UNGA has shown that it has the will to take action and create policies in pursuit of the goals of the Resolution, particularly when supported by international organisations. Lastly, the fact that Resolutions 63/168 and 68/262 both passed despite opposition from one or more UNSC member shows that the UNGA Resolutions have the potential to achieve meaningful policy change without falling prey to great power competition.

The United Nations Security Council:

The UNSC is another principal organ of the United Nations, charged with the maintenance of international peace and security as well as accepting new members to the United Nations and approving any changes to its United Nations Charter. The UNSC is composed of the great powers that were the victors of World War II (the Soviet Union (now represented by Russia), the United Kingdom, France, Republic of China (now represented by the People's Republic of China), and the United States) serve as the body's five permanent members. These permanent members can veto any substantive UNSC Resolution. The Security Council also has 10 non-permanent members, elected on a regional basis to serve two-year terms. The body's presidency rotates monthly among its members.

Resolutions made by the UNSC are binding and, where applicable, can be enforced through UN Peacekeepers or other measures. Due to the veto powers bestowed on the permanent members, the only actions that can be taken are those that are consented upon by all UNSC Members. As a result, during the Cold War, the UNSC was often deadlocked and unable to ratify any substantial Resolutions. The end of the Cold War and the (albeit temporary) retreat of Russia and China has broken the deadlock, allowing the UNSC to pass increasingly pro-active Resolutions, starting with the United Nations Mission to Kuwait during the Gulf War. The pro-active shift of the UNSC was supported by the UN Secretary-General at the time, Boutros Boutros-Ghali. He believed that the UNSC had the potential to respond to crises around the world borne out of ethnic tensions, resource

scarcity and extremism and that its mandate and power should expand towards preventing conflict and protecting (and if necessary, enforcing) human rights⁶. His views on expanding the UNSC mandate not only resulted with new policies directly relevant to security being applied (such as *Responsibility to Protect* and the concept of humanitarian intervention), but also led to a number of issues normally not considered relevant to security to be judged as security risks.

As a result of this on-going process of *securitization* - which is described as the process of state actors transforming subjects into matters of “security” in an extreme version of politicization that enables extraordinary means to be used in the name of security⁷ - the UNSC has ratified an increasing number of Resolutions on matters that would not traditionally fall under its jurisdiction, thereby setting the precedent for further deepening.

The UNSC Resolution 1308 was sponsored by the United States and adopted on 17 July 2000 and represents the first time a UNSC Resolution was made on a health issue. It highlighted that the HIV/AIDS epidemic had a heavy impact on society and was exacerbated by violence, potentially leading to instability and emergency situations if left unchecked. The Resolution emphasized the importance of a co-ordinated international response and foregrounded the fact that the UNSC had an important role to play in managing the crisis⁸.

A subsequent UNSC Resolution, 1645 adopted in December 2005, continued the securitisation trend. Co-ordinating with the UNGA and building up upon the Security-Development narrative that Boutros-Ghali spearheaded, Resolution 1645 recognised that human rights, development, peace and security are mutually reinforcing and connected. There was a need for a co-ordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation. The text reaffirmed the

6. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “An Agenda For Peace”, United Nations, 31-January-1992, <http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/47/277>, [Accessed 04-August-2016]

7. Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, p. 25.

8. “Security Council, Adopting ‘Historic’ Resolution 1308 (2000) on HIV/AIDS, Calls for Pre-Deployment Testing, Counselling for Peacekeeping Personnel”, United Nations, 17-July-2000, <<http://www.un.org/press/en/2000/20000717.sc6890.doc.html>>, [Accessed 04-August-2016]

primary responsibility of national governments for determining post-conflict priorities and strategies, while the role of all countries, civil society, regional organisations and non-governmental organisations were important in peacebuilding. The Resolution also led to the creation of an Intergovernmental Organisation, the *United Nations Peacebuilding Commission* whose purpose is bring together all stakeholders to advise and propose strategies for building peace and reconciliation after a conflict, to focus on the restoration of state institutions and make recommendations to improve co-ordination within and outside the United Nations⁹.

By ratifying these Resolutions, the UNSC has shown that it subscribes to Boutros-Ghali's vision of the United Nations in that "security" can no longer be within the narrow lines of military security but instead covers a range of complex relationships that include public health, rule of law, economics and development. This narrative has been taken on by a number of other organisations, most significantly the United States military, applying the premise of the development-security nexus to its Counterinsurgency Doctrine. The precedents set by the UNSC and the mainstreaming of the development-security nexus means that an Iraqi Resolution for Reconstruction and Development that appeals to this narrative is likely to find a receptive audience in the UNSC and is thus of significant relevance.

Strategic Utilisation of the UN Channels: The UNGA or UNSC?

Thus far, it has been displayed that there is precedence in the United Nations to accept Resolutions submitted by a Single state and based on humanitarian or developmental concerns. Moreover, the bodies of the United Nations have shown remarkable flexibility in enabling Resolutions, creating semi-binding regimes for non-binding UNGA Resolutions or passing development-related Resolutions through the UNSC that would normally not consider them.

Thus, the decision of which organ of the United Nations to pass the proposal through would not, at a glance, seem like a significant choice. However, there are a number of practical and tactical factors to consider on this matter. This report argues that the UNGA should be the primary UN

9. "Security Council, Acting Concurrently with General Assembly, Establishes Peacebuilding Commission to Advice on Post-Conflict Situations", United Nations, 20-December-2005, <<http://www.un.org/press/en/2005/sc8593.doc.htm>>, [Accessed 04-August-2016]

Channel for passing the Resolution. The UNSC, however, should be kept open as an option and be used either in the unlikely event of the UNGA vote failing or in the event of the UNGA referring the Resolution to the UNSC.

If the Iraqi delegation to the United Nations chooses to go through the UNGA, it can sponsor the Resolution directly and on its own. Although securing the support of other Members and co-sponsoring the Resolution with them would be helpful towards making a stronger statement, this would be a tactical choice, not a requirement. However, if the Resolution was to be proposed through the UNSC, Iraq would either need to secure the support of a UNSC Member-State or it would need to apply for a non-permanent position within the UNSC.

There is no guarantee that Iraqi might be able to get a non-permanent spot or reliably secure the support of another UNSC Member-State to make the proposal on its behalf. In addition, even if a UNSC Member-State agreed to sponsor the Resolution on Iraq's behalf, it would take negotiating power out of the hands of the Iraqi delegation and risk diluting the Resolution with other interests, especially in the light of the revival of the Russo-American strategic competition. As such, proposing the Resolution through the UNGA is a far more preferable option for the Iraqi delegation if it wishes to retain control of the proceedings.

Another reason for proposing the Resolution through the UNGA is that the majority of the UNGA members are developing countries. They use the Assembly as the source of much of their diplomatic influence and the principal outlet for their foreign relations initiatives and are often able to determine the agenda of the Assembly using coordinated groups such as the G77, which Iraq is part of. A Resolution for to the Reconstruction and Development of Iraq is likely to find a sympathetic audience within the UNGA, especially if the prevailing sentiments of opposition to the Iraq War of 2003, in conjunction with the findings of the Chilcot Inquiry can be utilised to generate a sense of solidarity between the Iraqi delegation and its audience.

Should the support for the Resolution be overwhelming, it could even compel the members that could oppose the vote to join in support to save face. At the very least, it would compel them to put up a far smaller resistance,

as it would be diplomatically unfeasible to put vehement opposition to a Resolution that will be voted in regardless. Iraq is unlikely to find a similarly sympathetic audience in the UNSC which is occupied partially by the powers responsible for the Iraq War, suffering from exhaustion on Iraq-related issues and is currently more occupied with the conflicts in Syria and Crimea. Therefore, even if Iraq decides to sponsor the Resolution alone, it will still need to be tactical about how to leverage support so that the vote can have a successful outcome. As it will be explained further, a lot of it has to do with knowing the audience.

Lastly, proposing the Resolution through the UNGA also gives the Iraqi delegation the opportunity to gauge reactions and make further amendments to the proposal as necessary. This is particularly important towards acquiring the support of major powers which, although not necessary to achieve UNGA consensus, would be immensely helpful towards initiating policies that lead to meaningful change. Should an Iraqi proposal in the UNGA generate lukewarm reaction (or opposition) among great powers, it would inform the Iraqi delegation at minimal risk. The delegation can then engage in bilateral negotiations with these powers and make amendments to the proposal, making it more appealing and earning the consent of the States that had previously opposed. In the event of the Resolution being referred to the UNSC for a second round of voting, the fact that Member-States have already shown their hand during the UNGA vote would inform the Iraqi delegation's arguments, increasing the likelihood of a successful outcome.

Guidelines for a Prospective Resolution

Regardless of whether the Resolution is voted through the UNGA or the UNSC, the Iraqi delegation to the United Nations will need to ensure the proposal is researched vigorously to identify the concerns of the Member-States and addressing them in order to generate support or, at the very least, prevent opposition.

To this end, one of the first and foremost concerns to address is to justify why Iraq requires reconstruction and development assistance. After all, development and reconstruction programmes were enacted by the Coalition forces in Iraq after 2003, as part of their Counterinsurgency doctrine devised by General David Petraeus. Just like Boutros-Ghali's

own linkages regarding development and security, Petraeus linked a secure environment to the conditions for reconstruction activities, such as establishing effective governance, rebuilding infrastructure, and putting unemployed workers back to work. This in turn, he argued, leads to more security as the local populace is won over to the side of the counterinsurgent forces and the supported government¹⁰. However, Coalition troops failed to provide sufficient security in the areas they operated. As a result, instead of attracting workers and providing employment, the development projects presented tempting targets for the insurgents, discrediting what the Coalition was trying to achieve in the process¹¹.

Moreover, development projects were spread unevenly. The progress report for the World Bank's Iraq Trust Fund shows that the majority of the development projects focused on central and southern Iraq. Of the 24 projects implemented, Nineveh and Anbar (the regions where the Islamic State would go on to operate heavily) received some of the fewest and the project targets in Anbar fell short due to issues relating to land availability and security¹². Failings such as these led to the persistence of chronic underdevelopment, shortage and poverty in the years after the war¹³.

Indeed, when responding to the points made by the Chilcot Inquiry, then-Prime Minister Tony Blair himself conceded that the United Kingdom's preparation for the post-Saddam Iraq was wholly inadequate¹⁴. These conditions did not only contribute to the suffering of Iraqis, they were also used as a propaganda tool by the Islamic State. During its initial offensive on 2014, it presented itself as a more efficient and reconstructive force than the Iraqi Government, using the vast funds and equipment it had

10. David H. Petraeus, James F. Amos, "Counterinsurgency", Department of the Army, December 2006.

11. Eric T. Olson, "When the Islamic State is Gone, What Comes Next?", War on the Rocks, 09-August-2016, <<http://warontherocks.com/2016/08/when-the-islamic-state-is-gone-what-comes-next/>>, [Accessed 09-August-2016]

12. "International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq: World Bank Iraq Trust Fund Progress Report", The World Bank, 06-December-2010, p. 12

13. Lionel Beehner, "Iraq's Faltering Infrastructure", Council on Foreign Relations, 22-June-2006, <<http://www.cfr.org/iraq/iraqs-faltering-infrastructure/p10971>>, [Accessed 09-August-2016]

14. FULL SPEECH : Tony Blair Speech : I Accept Full Responsibility For Iraq War - Chilcot Report. Perf. Tony Blair. YouTube. BBC, 6 July 2016. Web. 10 Aug. 2016. <<https://youtu.be/iIAB9AEHVQc>>.

captured to conduct infrastructure projects in the areas they captured for local support¹⁵.

What little infrastructure that existed in the region has since been damaged or destroyed over the course of the fight against the Islamic State¹⁶.

For these reasons, the proposal for a Resolution on Iraqi Reconstruction and Development will need to emphasize why the previous attempts have failed to foster the sufficient levels of development, citing information not just from a wide variety of sources including data from the Iraqi Government, existing UN development programs and Coalition activities, as well as statements of high-profile figures such as Tony Blair in the wake of the Chilcot Inquiry to reinforce the narrative that reconstruction and development policies enacted in Iraq after 2003 were insufficient and conducted with little understanding of the reality on the ground. The Iraqi Government will then need to provide a detailed account on what lessons have been learned from the past and how it can ensure that reconstruction and redevelopment policies are implemented properly. By appealing to the existing development-security and counterinsurgency narrative, it can display that Iraqi reconstruction, stability and development is not just in the interest of the Iraqi people, but also the world, as it will be instrumental towards ensuring that another round of insurgency, terrorism and refugee crisis following the demise of the Islamic State cannot take place.

As mentioned above, the findings of the Chilcot Inquiry can act as a rallying point for support, in highlighting that the Coalition readiness for post-Saddam Iraq and the subsequent attempts at reconstruction and development were insufficient and that the global powers have an opportunity to correct for the mistakes of the past. However, emphasizing the Inquiry findings carries a risk that it can put potential donors such as the United States and the United Kingdom on the defensive, prompting them to absolve themselves of responsibility instead of backing the Resolution whereas it will likely garner a more positive response among their rivals

15. Nour Malas, "Iraqi City Mosul Transformed A Year After Islamic State Capture", The Wall Street Journal, 9-June-2015, <<http://www.wsj.com/articles/iraqi-city-of-mosul-transformed-a-year-after-islamic-state-capture-1433888626>>, [Accessed 09-August-2016]

16. Eric T. Olson, "When the Islamic State is Gone, What Comes Next?", War on the Rocks, 09-August-2016, <<http://warontherocks.com/2016/08/when-the-islamic-state-is-gone-what-comes-next/>>, [Accessed 09-August-2016]

(such as Russia) or the G77. How this narrative is framed is a tactical choice dependent on the audience the Iraqi delegation wants to earn the support of.

Indeed, understanding the sensibilities of the audience, knowing their concerns and biases and addressing (or appealing to) them is in Iraq's best interests.

This is especially important if the Resolution goes through the UNSC where any permanent Member-State has a power to veto. For instance, the West is suffering from significant political exhaustion as a result of the conflicts in Iraq and Syria and its actions are increasingly framed by its relationships with other powers such as Russia or Turkey, through fears of internal terrorism or, in the case of the United States, the upcoming elections. Further military, economic and political entrenchment is something that it is unlikely to desire. Similarly, Russia is currently involved in two conflicts, Ukraine and Syria, and suffering economically due to low oil prices and sanctions.

It is therefore unlikely to afford significant support unless it can peg it to its existing security concerns. The proposal should therefore address any fears of entrenchment potential donors might have, avoiding getting entangled in their own competitions while emphasizing why supporting the Resolution is in their best interests. This can be achieved by setting up a clear, concrete roadmap on how much assistance is needed, where and why they are needed and how they will be implemented. Where available, the proposal should suggest using existing United Nations development agencies such as the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) or non-UN international organisations such as the IMF (Which has already provided Iraq with \$5.34 Billion Loan and therefore has an active interest in a stable, reconstructed Iraq¹⁷) or the World Bank.

These organisations already have expertise on the issues of peacebuilding, post-war reconstruction and development. In the case of UNAMI and the World Bank, they already have experience in providing

17. "Iraq Gets \$5.34 Billion IMF Loan to Support Economic Stability", IMF, 14-July-2016, <<https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2016/07/12/14/31/NA071416-Iraq-Gets-IMF-Loan-to-Support-Economic-Stability>>, [Accessed 16-August-2016]

assistance to Iraq. The possibility of reducing costs and commitment through the employment and re-invigoration of these existing mechanisms would appeal to donor states as well as expedite the implementation of the reconstruction and development actions. This, in turn, would likely prove attractive to global powers, increasing the likelihood that they will provide support for the Resolution.

Conclusion

With the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq is reaching its final stages, it is becoming increasingly important to start thinking of what comes next and how a repeat of the catastrophes of the past few years can be avoided, taking concrete steps towards providing lasting reconstruction and development to the Iraqi society. With the Iraqi economy suffering heavily, outside support will be needed and the United Nations represents one of the best avenues to achieve that.

By looking at Resolutions that passed within the UNGA and the UNSC, this report has established that there is a precedence for a single Member-State to sponsor a proposal based on non-urgent humanitarian concerns, gather support and have it successfully voted in. The report has established that such Resolutions can be voted in the UNGA despite great power opposition, as long as it galvanises the rest of the UNGA Member-States. The report also identified that a number of UNGA Resolutions, despite being non-binding, have led to policy change, thus highlighting its power. As a result, the report suggested that the Iraqi delegation to the UN should pass such a Resolution through the UNGA instead of the UNSC where there is a greater likelihood of the vote failing or otherwise getting hijacked by great power rivalries.

The report highlighted the importance of creating a clear roadmap on how the support will be used and provided guidelines on what the Iraqi delegation should keep in mind when proposing the Resolution. Ultimately, the report concludes that the likelihood of success for such a Resolution is very high, but only as long as the delegation recognises the biases and concerns of their audience and know how to take advantage to the established narrative within the UN to garner support.